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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE A. SI~IS, ~I. K. SIMS,
EL~IER L. SI~IS and G. GRANT
SI~IS, d/b/a SALT LAKE
TRANSFER CO~[p ANY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

CASE

No. 7377

PUBLIC SER\TJCE COMMISSION
OF UTAH and MAGNA-GARFIELD TRUCK LINE, a corporation,
Defendants.

nn rEF OF PLAINTIFFS
:--;TATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs above named are partners doing business under the style of Salt Lake Tran.sfer Company
and having a principal place of business at Salt Lake
City, Utah and being engaged in transportation of commodities for hire over irregular routes within the State
of Utah, both as a contract motor carrier and as a common motor carrier under authority issued by the Public
Rervice Commission of Utah.
The defendant, Public Service Commission of Utah,
l
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is now and at all times herein Btated was a body corporate created and existing by virtue of the laws of the
State of Utah. The defendant Magna-Garfield Truck
Line is a Utah corporation operating as a regular route
common carrier between Salt Lake City, Utah, on the
one hand, and on the other the communities of :l\Iagna
and Garfield, serving certain intermediate points.
On or about the lOth day of November, 1947 the
plaintiffs above named filed an application (R. 1) with
the Public Service Commission of Utah for a contract
n1otor carrier permit to transport sugar in intrastate
commerce between West Jordan, Utah and Salt Lake
City, Utah. After due and legal notice of such hearing
was given pursuant to the regulationt; of the Commission the matter came on regularly for hearing before
the Commission on F'ebruary 5, 1948 at which time evidence was adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs, as applicants, of a contract between applicants and the UtahIdaho Sugar Company of Salt Lake City, Utah to transport sugar as a contract motor carrier between 'VP~t
Jordan, Utah and Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 3) and the
evidence therein adduced by witnesses representing the
applicants and the said Sugar Company established,
without contradiction, that the applicants had been engaged continuously in the transportation of such Rugar
between said points as a contract carrier for more than
ten years next preceding the time of said hearing, (R.
66, 80, 92) and that the said West Jordan, Utah plant
is within a ten mile radius of Salt Lake City, Utah. (R.
141)
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In opposition thereto the defendant, .Magna-Garfield
Truek Line, as protestant, adduced evidence to show it
wn~ regularly operating between Salt Lake City and
the said point of \Yest Jordan and that it endeavored
to serYe in the transportation of the said sugar. However, the representative of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Comlmny testified that additional service such as that provided by the applicants was needed for the demands of
their business in transporting sug-ar. (R. 92)
The applicants further testified that they had on file
the necessary insurance, (R. 7!1) complied with the regulations of the Commission (R. 80) had adequate trucks
and equipment (R. 82) for rendering the proposed service and that the addition or continuation of their service
would not unduly burden the highway (R. 68) nor
unduly interfere with the traveling public and that the
granting of the application would not be detrimental to
the best interests of the people of the State of Utah.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defendant, Public Service Commission of Utah, under date of July 1'9,
1948 issued its Report and Order (R. 41) wherein it
failed to make any finding whatsoever as to the establiohed period of service by the applicants to the UtahIdaho Sugar Company and denied the said application
to operate as a contract motor carrier of sugar.
On July 21, 1948 the plaintiffs herein, as applicants,
executed and made a motion and application for rehearing in said Case No. 3195, a copy of which has been
separately filed herein, serving a copy thereof July 26,
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1948 upon the defendant Magna-Garfield Truck Line, by
mailing it to its attorney, and on the 27th day of July
1948 filed the original and two copies of said application and motion for rehearing with the Public Service
Commission of Utah. Said motion is not made a part of
the record filed by the Public :Service Commis.sion of
Utah.
Under date of July 31, 1948 the defendant, MagnaGarfield Truck Line, through its attorney of record,
executed, mailed and filed its ''brief in opposition to
applicants' petition for rehearing and reconsideration"
wherein it opposed the granting of the requested rehearing. On or about the 15th day of April, 1949 the plaintiffs were advised by a representative of the Commission
that the motion for rehearing was not in their files and
could not after diligent search be located or found by
them and thereupon on the 22d day of April, 1949 the
plaintiffs re-filed with the Commission a duplicate copy
of the said application and motion for rehearing, attached hereto, said duplicate is a part of this record.
(R. 45)
On the 29th day of July, 1949 the defendant, Public
Service Commission of Utah in said Case No. 3HI:l
issued its Order (R. 48) denying the motion for rehearing and reconsideration and mailed a copy thereof to the
plaintiffs' attorney.
The plaintiffs then filed with this court a Petition
for Writ of Review on August 12, 1949 and a Writ wa.~
issued and a return made thereon.

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. The Public Service COinmission of Utah erred
in its failure to make any findings regarding the contract
motor carrier sE-rvice being rL·ndered by the plaintiffs
to the Utah Idaho Sugar Company on January 1, 1940.
2. The Public Service Commission of Utah erred
in failing to grant to the plaintiffs authority to transport,
as a contract motor carrier, sugar between West Jordan
and Salt Lake City; Utah fo:r the Utah Idaho Sugar
Company as a "grandfather" right.
The Public Service Commission of Utah erred
in finding that applicants failed to show that existing
transportation facilities do not provide adequate ' or
reasonable service as required by title 76-5-21~ Laws of
Utah, 1945.
3.

4. The Public Service Commission of Utah erred
in finding that the granting of this application would be
detrimental to the best interests of the people in the
area covered by the application.
5. The Public Service Commission of Utah erred
in finding that the granting of the authority to the plaintiffs would detract from the business of existing carriers
which would eventually impair rather than improve
transportation service and that there is sufficient service already available in the area proposed to be served
by plaintiffs.
6. The Public Service Commission of Utah erred
in denying the plaintiffs' application to so operate as a
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contract motor carrier of sugar between West Jordan
and Salt Lake City, Utah for and in behalf of Utah Idaho
Sugar Company.
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENTS
POINT 1.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT PLAINTIFFS
WERE CONDUCTING A LEGAL, EXEMPT CONTRACT
CARRIER OPERATION ON JANUARY 1, 1940 AND ARE
ENTITLED TO A PERMIT UNDER THE 1945 AMENDMENT TO TRANSPORT SUGAR BETWEEN WEST JORDAN
AND SALT LAKE CITY.

The Commission erred in failing to recognize or
n1ake a finding on the fact that the applicant.s were conducting a contract motor carrier service for transporting sugar between West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah
for the Utah Idaho Sugar Company on and prior to
tlanuary 1, 1940. The present law relating to contract
motor carrier's authority is Section 76-5-21 Utah Code
Annotated as amended by Laws of Utah 1945, Chapter
105, to-wit:

''It shall be unlawful for any contract motor
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate commerce without having first obtained from the Commission a permit therefor. The Commission shall
grant on application to any applicant who was a
contract motor carrier as defined by this act on
the 1st day of January, 1940, a permit to operate
as a contract motor carrier on the same highways
and to carry on the same type of motor gerviee
as he was on said date.
"The Commission upon the filing of an application for a contract motor carrier's permit -Hhall
6
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fix a time and place for hearing thereon and 11w~·
give the same notice as provided in Section
76-5-18 hereof. If, from all the te~timony offered
at said hearing, the comn1ission ,._hall determine
that the highways over which the applicant de~ires to operate are not unduly burdened; that
the g-ranting of the application will not unduly
interfere with the traveling public; and that the
granting of the application will not be detrimental
to the best interests of the people of the state of
Utah and/or to the localities to be served, and if
the existing transportation facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable service, the commission shall grant such permit."
The first paragraph is the ''grandfather'' provision
enacted to give recognition to existing legal operations
which were altered by this H).!;) amendment. The law
prior to such amendment contained the following exception from the requirement of a certificate or permit from
the Commission, to-wit:

76-5-25 (a)
"No portion of this act shall apply:
(a) To contract 1notor carriers of property
when operating wholly within the limits of an
incorporated city or town and for a distance of
not exceeding fifteen road miles beyond the corporate limits of the city or town in Utah in which
the point of origin of any property or passenger
movement is located or when operated within a
radius of 15 miles from any point of origin outside of an incorporated city or town in Utah, and
which movement either alone or in conjunction
with another vehicle or vehicles is not a part of
any journey or haul heyond said fifteen-mile
limit;''
7
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Thus, prior to the _amendment of the statute, applicants served the Utah Idaho Sugar Company plant as
a contract motor carrier under the exemption, said plant
at West Jordan being approximately 10 miles from Salt
Lake City, Utah (R. 81). The evidence before the Commission waB that the applicants proposed to carry on
the same type of service as a contract carrier for sugar
as they had been conducting for a number of years past.
(R. 80, 92, 67).
It is to be observed that in the wisdom of the Legislature and in order to conform with the constitutional
requirements, the "grandfather" provision referred to
above was essential in the existing statutes so as to
afford the shipping public a continuation of the services
which they have utilized and found necessary or desi:r;-,.
Ehle for the conduct of their business. It was not contemplated that the transporters of commodities only
during an emergency war period should be continued in
force, but the Legislature looked back to the first day
of January 1940 considering such to be a normal year of
operation and said that those carriers who were then
operating as contract motor carriers should, upon application, be granted a permit to operate as a contract
rnotor carrier on the same highways and to carry on th(•
same type of motor service as was being performed on
that date. The applicants in this proceeding comr
squarely within the pervue of that statutory provision.
This court in construing an earlier similar ''grandfather'' statute, held in the case of McCarthy et al. vs.
P.S.C.U. et al., 77 Pac. (2nd) 331, 94 Ut. 304 that eom8
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peting conunon carriers would be entitled to notice of the
time of hearing and pern1itted to appear in the proceeding-~. In full con1pliance with this ruling the Commission
p;nYe notice to the protestant, Magna-Garfield Truck
Line. and a number of other carriers, as shown by the
Affidavit of :J[ailing (R. 6), and it was in pursuance
of ~uch notice that the :Jiag-na-Garfield Truck Line appeared in opposition at the time of the hearing. Since
the enactment of the 19-1;') statute, your Court had occasion to construe the language thereof in the case of
Rowley vs. Public Service Commission of Utah et al., 185
Pac. (2nd) 514, ______ Utah ------· In that case, the applicant
sought rather wide-spread authority to transport a variet~- of commodities within the State of Utah. It was
contended by the applicant in that matter that because
he was conducting wide-spread service as of January 1,
1940, that the Commission was bound to grant to him
a permit to operate as a contract motor carrier over the
named highways of this state. The record showed, apparently without dispute, that the applicant, Rowley, had
been carrying on said operations, not within any exemption under the statute, but b~- way of unlawful operation
on the highways of Utah. Your Court in the Rowley case
affirmed the order of the P.S.C.U. denying to ~fr. Rowley authority under the ''grandfather'' provision of Section 76-5-21 referred to above because his operations as
of January 1, 1940 were illegal operations. We shall
quote from pages 519 and 520 of the Raid deciRion the
following portions :
Page 519:
"(3) To interpret this act as contenrle(l for
f)
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by applicant would not only disregard sound public policy; it would further disregard the ordinary
concept of not permitting rights to be acquired
by committing criminal acts against the state, and
in the final analysis, it would result in the unique
doctrine of the more flagrant the violation, the
greater the rights acquired."
Page 520:
"If the legislature did not intend to place
a stamp of approval on illegal operations, then
what was the necessity or reason for the court's
extending ''grandfather'' rights under the 1945
act to legally operating carriers without extending them to operators not complying with the law~
The reason was that the deletion of sub-sections
(a) and (i) of Section 76-5-25 broadened the statute and brought within the provisions of the act
every contract carrier operating within cities and
towns and also casual -contract carriers, which
necessarily included a great many legally-operating carriers.
''Many of these operators had substantial
investments in the business and had acquired the
privilege to operate with consent of the State.
Considering the date used in the act, they had
been· operating on the roads for at least five
years, and it is reasonable to assume that there
would be no necessity for them to establish the
following facts: That their vehicles would not
unduly burden the highways over which they had
been operating; that their operations would not
be detrimental to the best interests of the people
of the state or the people of the localities served;
that their trucks would not unduly interfere with
the traveling public; and that their employment
would not subject shippers to the hazards of dealing with irresponsible carriers. It is further reasonable to assume that their services were needed
10
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and desired. Had they not been, it is doubtful
that the operations would have continued over a
period of five years.
'·''"'"ere it neressa ry for this court to determine why the legislature selected the ~Tear 1940,
it could be determined logically and reasonably.
Undoubtedly many opera tors were on the road in
19-!5 due to the large movement of war .-;upplies.
The record indicates a major portion of the hauling done by the applicant was in transporting
the~w items. Conditions did not lend themselve~
to adequate checking and supervising of vehicles
on the highways. To grant privileges to those
operators who, because of movements incidental
to war. had established themselves in business
after 1940 might be founding rights on false and
temporary conditions that would not be fair and
reasonable to the carrier who had established
permanency and stability. It would not be an
unreasonable classification to prefer those operators who had established themselves during normal times, and who had been in business long
enough to indicate their capacity to operate and
their ability to satisfy and protect the public."
The applicants, Salt Lake Transfer Cmnpany, were
already operating over the highways of Utah as of
January 1, 1940 within the non-exempt areas as both a
common carrier of commoditieR for hire pursuant to a
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity issued by the
Commission and affirmed by your court (R. 135) and
as a contract motor carrier pursuant to a permit from
the Commission (R. 71). As pointed out by Commissioner Hacking (R. 75) the Salt Lake Transfer Company could have served West tTordan without any authorit~v under the old law. The application before the
11
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Commission was on a regular printed form which waE
utilized by the Commission both before and since the
inception of the 1945 amendment whereby carriers applied to the Commission for contract carrier authority.
It must be clearly held in mind that this is not a new
movement of commodities which is being covered by this
application, but rather it is merely a request that the
Commission, pursuant to the 1945 statute, grant the
contract motor carrier permit to carry on the same type
of motor service on the same highways as the applicant
was conducting, so far as the transportation of sugar is
concerned, on and before January 1, 1940.
The defendant herein and proteBtant before thr
Commission, Magna-Garfield Truck Lines, through its
counsel, has attempted to press for a construction of
said 1945 statute so that the first paragraph referring
to the "grandfather" rights is completely modified,
limited and restricted by the second paragraph, which,
according to the interpretation, logically placed upon it,
refers to the procedure when a new applicant for contract carrier service not heretofore provided to the public
or to a contracting party ha3 been submitted for consideration. Perhaps it is unfortunate that the legislature
has embodied all of the procedure relating to contract
carriers into a single section of the 1948 amendment.
The legislature did take the precaution of segregating
the ''grandfather'' rights by jncorporating the same in
a separate paragraph. Then by the second paragraph
of the said section the procedure was set forth for the
CommisBion to follow in the event that a new contract
carrier service is being proposed before the Commission.
12
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To hold otherwise would in psselH'l' nullify the purposes
and the concept of the "grandfather" rights under a
motor carrier or a public utility regulation statute.
The applicants herein in good faith carried on their
operations as a contract motor carrier with the Utah
Idaho Sugar Company and though such operation was
well known to the Commission, no steps were ever taken
by the Commission to modify or change their operation
until sometin1e subsequent to the enactment of the 1945
amendment to the motor carrier act, (R. 84, 85) ; though
temporary authority had been obtained from the Commission for hauling sugar for this Company to points
cutside of the exempt 15 mile radius, none has been
requested or required within the said 15 mile radius
of Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 85, 86).
POINT 2.
THE COMMISSION WAS BOUND BY THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE TO GRANT TO THE PLAINTIFFS
THEIR "GRANDFATHER" RIGHTS TO CONDUCT THE
REQUESTED CONTRACT CARRIER OPERATION.

For the reason set forth in the preceding argument No. 1, it is strenuously contended that the P.S.C.U.
erred in failing to grant to the plaintiffs the requested
authority to transport sugar between West Jordan and
Salt Lake City, Utah as a contract motor carrier with
the Utah Idaho Sugar Company under the said "grandfather" right. We urge that all that was required of
the applicant in said matter, under the 1945 amend1nent,
was that they file an application with the Commission
that proper notice thereof be given and that they show
the contract relationship which Pxi.sted as of .January

13
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1, 1940, under which, service has been continuously rendered since said date. The ancillary evidence of ability
to perform adequate ·equipment and proper insurance as
well as compliance with the regulations of the Commission have been clearly adduced in the record (R. 79, 80,
82).
May we point out the fallacy of modifying the
''grandfather'' rights paragraph of Section 76-5-21, as
amended, by the second paragraph which requires the
Commission to determine, among other thing.s, that the
highways are not unduly burdened and that the granting
of the application will not unduly interfere with the
traveling public, etc. The fact that the applicants are
entitled to the "grandfather" authority is by virtue of
the fact that they are already rendering to the public,
over these same highways, the very service which they
are seeking to be confirmed. Thus, the issue of unduly
burdening the highway, interfering with the traveling
public, etc. can not be properly considered as no additional burden or interference will result from the granting of the right to perform the same service as a contract motor carrier on the .same highways. See: Rowley
vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, supra.
The record is replete with evidence that the applicants have, pursuant to an oral contract with the Utah
Idaho Sugar Co., conducted this same type of contract
motor carrier service prio·r to and on January i, 1940
and continuously since then over the same highways.
Thus, the granting of a permit at this time to ronfirm
the heretofore exempt operation, conducted in good faith
by the applicants, could not possibly increaNe or rhangr
14
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the burden upon the highway~. Likewise the issue of
whether the existing transportation facilities provide
adequate or reasonable service is not material to the
determination of "grandfather" rights as it is self evident that the continued serYice oYer the same highway.s
for the san1e shipper for oYer ten years proves that the
€xisting transportation facilitie~ do not provide adequate
or reasonable service and hence such issue is not a
proper part of the "grandfather'' rights section of the
19-!5 1notor carrier act amendment.
\Ye therefore respectfully urge that as to the
"grandfather" rights of the applicants there is absolutely no conflicting or contrary evidence adduced by
the protestant or in any way a part of the record now
hefore this court that would in any way deny that the
applicants herein have for more than ten years last past
continuously served in the transportation of sugar between West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah for the
Utah Idaho Sugar Company under a contractural agreement between the parties. The recent reduction of said
eontract to writing upon a form provided by the P.R.C.U.
(R. 4), dated November 10, 1947, does not 1ninimize
in any way the existence of an oral continuous contractual relationship prior thereto. The existence of such
relationship is confirmed in the record by the testimony
of the applicants as well as the testimony of Mr. H. W.
Ansell, general traffic manager for the Utah Idaho
Rugar Co. (R. 92).
POINT 3.
IN ADDITION TO "GRANDFATHER" RIGHTS, PLAINTIFFS PROVED ALL ESSENTIALS FOR GRANTING OF
]f)
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'l'HE REQUESTED CONTRACT
TRANSPORT SUGAR.

CARRIER

PERMIT

TO

It is the position of the plaintiffs that the fir.st
two errors set forth above are such that your court
should reverse the Public Service Commission and order
the granting of t,he requested authority by the plaintiffs.
\Vithout waiving the basis for such a reversal predicated
upon the ''grandfather'' rights of the plaintiffs as set
forth in the brief thuB far, we shall discuss at this time
errors No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 under this present argument.
The plaintiffs, in addition to proving the ''grandfather" rights heretofore discussed, put in evidence the
festimony of the shipper whose interest is vitally concerned in this matter. This is a contract carrier application and it must be kept in mind that the element of
public convenience and necessity which iB an essential
of a common carrier application, is not at issue herein.
It is true that the 1945 amendment to the law, and particularly under the second paragraph thereof, refers to
the requirement that the Commission determine that the
existing transportation facilitieR do not provide adequate
or reasonable service. Mr. H. W. Ansell, general traffic
manager for Utah Idaho Sugar Company, testified (R.
87 to 112) and a review of his testimony clearly affirms
that the plaintiffs were rendering a supplementary ~erv
ice not provided by the existing transportation facilities.
The plant at West Jordan was served by the railroad but the shortage of frBight cars and the difficult~·
of procuring the same and having them moved from one
location to another wholly eliminated the rail facilities
for the movement of emergency shipments of sugar.
]6
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~Ir.

4-\.nsell te:-;tified that the defendant, l\lag·na-Oarfield
Truck Lines and the plaintiff~ have had in force the same
that they nsed the services of l\lagna-Garfield Truck
Lines at frequent interYals, however his testimony was
Yery clear that those existing facilities were inadequate.
To quote in part (R. 90) · · \\~ e have found that when
~ome exritement orcurs in the sugar businesB, which
happens quite frequently, either through some rumor
in the paper. or increase in priee, or removing of rationing, or son1e other purpose. why there is a sudden demand for sugar, and in that case, we have found that
the :J[agna-Garfield Truck Lines can not meet our requirements.'' The record clearly indicates that the plaintjffs have been and will be called upon to transport loadM
of 100 bags or more being a 10,000 lb. or more truck
load. Also the testimony was that the Magna-Garfield
Truck Lines and the plaintiff have had in force the same
rate of 10c per 100 for the moving of such loads. A
higher rate exists on I. t.l. movements by Magna-Garfield but a much lower rail rate exists for moving the
sugar. (R. 100) Despite vigorous cros.s-examination,
:Jfr. Ansell did not deviate from his position that the
service of the plaintiffs was very essential to their business as the sugar busines.s is highly competitive and
nny delays from whatever cause \vould result in the loss
c;f a sale or other prospective business. The evidence
vas further that no additional use of the facilities of
Ralt Lake Tran.sfer Company would be made different
from that utilized during the past ten years and that
~aid movements would be restricted to a 10,000 lb. minimum. (R. 111)
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We find absolutely nothing in the record upon which
the Commission could have based a finding that the
granting of the application would be detrimental to the
best interests of the people in the area covered by the
application. The only shipper involved and the only
public witness present was Mr. Ansell who strongly
urged the granting of the reque.sted authority. There
is nothing in the record that would show that the service
of the Magna-Garfield Truck Lines was in danger of
diminution in the event that this authority should be
granted. In fact, notwithstanding the use of the plaintiffs' trucks in emergencies from time to time during
the past years, the Magna-Garfield Truck Line has increased in the number of schedules and the number of
truck units.
The Magna-Garfield Truck Lines operates a scheduled service and use a limited number of trucks. The
plaintiffs, Salt Lake Transfer, have over 100 trucks
available and the testimony was that immediate service
could be rendered and provided in the movement of
loads of sugar from the West Jordan plant. We have
spoken of "·emergency" hauls for the Utah Idaho Sugar
Company. Though such phrase has been used the testimony is clear that the so-called emergencies were frequent enough so as to constitute a continued, though not
daily demand for occasional service. Mr. Ansell affirm€'d
the intention of the Utah Idaho Sugar Company to continue to utilize the services of the Magna-Garfield Truck
Lines in approximately the same volume in the future
2-.s had been used in the past and hence there is absolutely
no basis for the Public Service Commission of Utah to
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make a finding that the granting of the authorit~' would
detract froin the business of the existing earrier or that
it would eventually impair rather than improve transr;ortation service, or that there is sufficient service
alread~· available.
The right of parties to eontract in good faith is a
sacred right which should not be lightly cast aside. We
recognize that in the interest of orderly procedure the
Public Service COinmission of Utah has been granted
certain powers over contractural relationships between
a carrier of property for hire and citizens of the state.
'Ve submit that such powers must be used judicially to
the end that the needs of a large shipper of goods such
as the Utah Idaho Sugar Company may be reasonably
provided. "\Ve desire to reaffirm to the court the reasoning set forth in the case of Rowley vs. Public Service
Commission of Utah (Supra) wherein it was stated hy
your court that:
"Considering the date used in the act, they
had been operating on the roads for at least five
years, and it is reasonable to assume that there
would be no necessity for them to establish the
following facts: That their vehicles would not
unduly burden the highways over which they had
been operating; that their operations would not
be detrimental to the best interests of the people>
of the state or the people of the localities served~
that their trucks would not unduly interfere with
the traveling public; and that their employment
would not subject shippers to the hazards of
dealing with irresponsible carriers. It L;; further
reasonable to assume that their services were
needed and desired. Had they not been, it i~
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doubtful that the operations would have continued
over a period of five years.''
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully submit that
) our Honorable Court should enter an order directing
that the Public Service Commission of Utah reverse
its decision in the subject case and that the Commission
be ordered to grant to the plaintiffs authority to transport sugar for the Utah Idaho Sugar Company between
West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah as a contract
motor carrier for hire and that a proper permit thereon
be issued.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
Attorneys for Pla.intiffs
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